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PANEL VI:  THE COEXISTENCE OF PRIVACY 
AND SECURITY 
FOURTH AMENDMENT CODIFICATION AND 
PROFESSOR KERR’S MISGUIDED CALL FOR 
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
Daniel J. Solove* 
INTRODUCTION 
Criminal procedure courses covering search and seizure rules are almost 
always taught by focusing on the Fourth Amendment.  Yet it is becoming 
ever more the case that the Fourth Amendment is playing a smaller role in 
regulating law enforcement investigations involving information privacy.  
Fourth Amendment protection continues to recede from a litany of law 
enforcement activities, and it is being replaced by federal statutes.  We are 
witnessing a codification of the Fourth Amendment. 
This essay examines the development of Fourth Amendment 
codification.  Few have examined this trend.  Since the criminal procedure 
revolution of the Warren Court era, the courts have been the primary 
rulemakers in the field of criminal procedure.  Within the past few decades, 
however, we have witnessed the rise of a dualist system of criminal 
procedure, with statutes making up a sizeable portion of the rules.  This 
increasing codification raises several important questions:  Is the legislative 
regime for regulating searches and seizures better than the judicial regime?  
Are legislatures generally more capable than courts at crafting criminal 
procedure rules in the information age?  How should courts apply the 
Fourth Amendment in a realm where increasingly they are no longer the 
only rulemaker? 
In his provocative article, The Fourth Amendment and New 
Technologies:  Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, Professor 
Orin Kerr examines the rise of the statutory regime of criminal procedure 
when new technologies are involved.1  Kerr goes on to argue that “courts 
 
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School; J.D. Yale.  Thanks to 
Orin Kerr for thoughtful comments on this paper and for being cordial under attack.  Maeve 
Miller and Carly Grey provided helpful research assistance. 
 1. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:  Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, Constitutional 
Myths].   
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should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial caution when 
technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures to provide 
the primary rules governing law enforcement investigations involving new 
technologies.”2  Kerr suggests, in essence, that courts should back off and 
let the codification of the Fourth Amendment continue on its current course. 
Kerr’s focus is on new technologies, but the codification of the Fourth 
Amendment is expanding more broadly.  The first part of this Article argues 
that codification has arisen in areas where courts have left a void in Fourth 
Amendment protection.  These areas include new technologies, but they can 
more broadly be understood as involving issues of information privacy.  
Whereas courts have readily applied the Fourth Amendment for physical 
searches, tangible items, and actual trespasses, data presents a difficult 
issue, because it is often obtained in less physical ways that do not involve 
entering places or rummaging through things.  Data often exists apart from 
the subject, and is frequently in the possession of others.  Codification has 
arisen in these areas because of courts’ difficulty in applying the Fourth 
Amendment to information—whether in high-tech form (computer 
searches) or low-tech form (records held by companies). 
Nevertheless, Kerr’s focus on technology captures a large area of the 
codification of the Fourth Amendment.  His normative claim is that 
legislatures are more capable than courts of making the rules in this area.3  
It is here that Kerr’s argument goes significantly astray.  Certainly, the 
codified regime is better than no Fourth Amendment protection, and since it 
has arisen in areas largely left unprotected by the courts, it has filled a void.  
But Kerr believes that courts should allow the legislatures to take such a 
role, and in this regard, he seemingly endorses the trend of courts leaving 
areas outside of Fourth Amendment protection for legislatures to fill in with 
statutory rules.  Kerr makes a number of contentions about why legislatures 
are better able to address new technologies than courts,4 but these 
contentions are based on faulty assumptions that are not well grounded in 
either theory or practice.5  This Article examines these legislative rules and 
demonstrates their deficiencies when compared to Fourth Amendment 
protection. 
I.  FROM THE CONSTITUTION TO STATUTES 
Many countries regulate law enforcement primarily through a legislative 
or administrative regime.6  In the United States, however, constitutional 
rules provide the basis for a significant number of the rules governing law 
enforcement investigations.  In particular, three constitutional amendments 
 
 2. Id. at 805. 
 3. Id. at 807-08. 
 4. See infra Part II.A. 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See Craig M. Bradley, The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution 95-143 
(1993). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=786266
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in the Bill of Rights—the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments—address 
issues of criminal procedure.7 
A.  The Rise of the Fourth Amendment 
Beginning in the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice 
Earl Warren, radically transformed criminal procedure.  The criminal 
procedure revolution centered on the Fourth Amendment, which is the rule 
regulating what law enforcement officials can search and seize.  The Fourth 
Amendment provides as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.8 
The Fourth Amendment potentially can cover a large part of the criminal 
investigatory process.  For the Warren Court, the Fourth Amendment would 
become an enormous piece of the regulatory pie.  To play such a role, many 
components of the Fourth Amendment had to come together.  Piece by 
piece they did, with the rule reaching the pinnacle of its potential power in 
1967. 
First, to regulate law enforcement investigations, the Fourth Amendment 
required a large jurisdictional reach.  The United States, unlike other 
countries, does not have a centralized system of policing.  Rather, there are 
hundreds of thousands of law enforcement officials at the federal, state, and 
local levels.9  For a long time, the Fourth Amendment applied only to 
federal officials, who have always constituted a small component of law 
enforcement.10  It was not until 1949 that the Fourth Amendment was 
incorporated against the states in Wolf v. Colorado.11 
 
 7. The Fourth Amendment regulates police investigations.  It sets forth the rules for 
searches and seizures, and it defines the standards and procedure for obtaining warrants. U.S. 
Const. amend. IV.  The Fifth Amendment sets forth the rules for police questioning of 
suspects, grand juries, double jeopardy, and due process. U.S. Const. amend. V.  The Sixth 
Amendment contains the rules for the right to counsel, a speedy and public trial, and an 
impartial jury, as well as certain rights of defendants at trial (confrontation of witnesses, 
compulsory process). U.S. Const. at amend. VI. 
 8. U.S. Const. at amend. IV. 
 9. According to Bureau of Justice Statistics, there are 796,518 full-time state and local 
law enforcement officers and 93,446 full-time federal law enforcement officials. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2005); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fedle.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2005). 
 10. Federal law enforcement officials constitute only about ten percent of law 
enforcement officials in the United States. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, supra note 9. 
 11. 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). 
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Second, the Fourth Amendment needed a meaningful enforcement 
mechanism.  Today, the principal remedy for a Fourth Amendment 
violation is the exclusionary rule.  If the police violate the Fourth 
Amendment, the evidence obtained by the infringement is suppressed from 
the defendant’s criminal trial.  The Court originally created the exclusionary 
rule in 1914, in Weeks v. United States,12 but the rule only applied to the 
federal government.  Even after the Fourth Amendment was incorporated 
against the states in 1949, its remedy—the exclusionary rule—was not.  In 
1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,13 the Court finally held that the exclusionary rule 
applied to the states. 
The third and final component of the Fourth Amendment that was 
necessary for it to perform the regulatory role the Warren Court envisioned 
was the scope of its applicability.  “Applicability” refers to those particular 
law enforcement activities that the Fourth Amendment covers.  The Fourth 
Amendment applies to a law enforcement activity whenever there is a 
“search” or a “seizure.”14  If the Fourth Amendment applies, then it requires 
that the search or seizure be “reasonable,”15 which in many circumstances 
means that law enforcement officials must first obtain a warrant supported 
by probable cause.  There are, of course, many instances when the Fourth 
Amendment does not require a warrant or probable cause.  In all cases, 
however, the Fourth Amendment requires that the search or seizure be 
“reasonable.”  If the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a particular law 
enforcement activity, then it does not require any limitations on that 
activity. 
The problem facing the Warren Court was that, under existing 
interpretations, the Fourth Amendment had limited applicability.  In 1928, 
in Olmstead v. United States,16 the Court concluded that wiretapping did 
not trigger Fourth Amendment protections because the government did not 
trespass inside a person’s home:  “The Amendment does not forbid what 
was done here.  There was no searching.  There was no seizure.  The 
evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.  
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”17  Under this 
interpretation, the Fourth Amendment protected a person’s home from 
being intruded upon by government officials, a person’s letters from being 
opened, and a person’s papers from being seized.18  The Olmstead Court 
understood privacy violations as physical intrusions.  Therefore, the 
 
 12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 13. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 14. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 15. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 17. Id. at 464. 
 18. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding that one’s personal papers 
and documents were protected by the Fourth Amendment); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 717 
(1877) (holding that sealed letters were protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
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wiretapping in Olmstead did not implicate privacy concerns because the 
government did not trespass into the home. 
In 1967, the Warren Court reversed Olmstead in Katz v. United States.19  
Katz appeared to indicate a profound shift in Fourth Amendment analysis.  
Whereas the Court had previously applied the Fourth Amendment only in 
instances involving physical trespasses or the rummaging through of 
possessions or documents, the Katz Court boldly eliminated these tangible 
boundaries: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.  What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.20 
The Court’s current approach to applying the Fourth Amendment 
emerges from a concurring opinion by Justice John Harlan in Katz, who 
stated that applicability of the Fourth Amendment should turn on whether 
(1) a person exhibits an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and (2) 
“the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”21  At least in theory, Fourth Amendment applicability can be 
quite broad—indeed, it can apply whenever there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
In 1967, with these three components in place—jurisdiction 
encompassing all law enforcement officials, a powerful enforcement 
mechanism, and a broad scope of applicability—the Fourth Amendment 
was poised to become the primary rule to regulate law enforcement 
investigations.  Conventional wisdom has it that the Fourth Amendment did 
achieve such a role—although perhaps only in potential, for no sooner than 
all three components were in place, the Fourth Amendment began its 
decline. 
B.  The Decline of the Fourth Amendment 
Katz purported to usher in a wide scope of Fourth Amendment coverage 
based on a broad understanding of privacy.  Instead of expanding its 
understanding of privacy, however, the Court merely shifted its view, 
conceiving of privacy as a form of total secrecy—a conception I have 
referred to as the “secrecy paradigm.”22  Under this view, a privacy 
invasion only occurs if a deep secret is uncovered.  Therefore, if somebody 
could conceivably have peeked in on a person’s property or if a person 
revealed information to another, there can be no expectation of privacy. 
 
 19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 20. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). 
 21. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 22. See Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person:  Technology and Privacy in the 
Information Age 42 (2004) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Person]. 
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In a series of cases from 1983-1989, the Court held that visual or video 
surveillance in public falls outside of the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The police can fly above one’s home and inspect one’s 
backyard or even any structures that have openings in their roofs.23  The 
police can use sensory enhancement technology to magnify images that are 
exposed to the public, even if they could not detect them with the naked 
eye.24  The Court also concluded that a physical tracking device that 
monitored the movements of a person in public was not covered by the 
Fourth Amendment.25  According to the Court, a “person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”26 
Another limitation in Fourth Amendment applicability is the “third party 
doctrine,” which provides that, if information is possessed or known by 
third parties, then a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
regarding such information.27  For example, in 1976, in United States v. 
Miller,28 federal law enforcement officials sought a person’s financial 
records by subpoenaing them from his bank.29  The banks turned over the 
information.30  The bank customer argued that the Fourth Amendment 
applied to his records and that the government needed a search warrant to 
obtain them.31  The Court, however, disagreed, and concluded that the 
Fourth Amendment did not apply because the customer lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his bank records.32  According to the Court’s 
reasoning, “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government 
authorities.”33  Furthermore, the Court reasoned that “[a]ll of the documents 
obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only 
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their 
employees in the ordinary course of business.”34 
Three years later, in 1979, the Court held in Smith v. Maryland35 that the 
Fourth Amendment did not apply to pen registers—devices that recorded 
 
 23. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (upholding a helicopter inspection of a 
greenhouse missing a few roof panels from a helicopter); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986) (upholding a flyover inspection of a backyard from a flyover). 
 24. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). 
 25. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983). 
 26. Id. at 281. 
 27. See generally Computer Crime and Intellectual Prop. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Manual on Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal 
Investigations § I.B.3 (2001), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/sdsmanual2002.htm 
[hereinafter DOJ Manual] (written by Orin Kerr). 
 28. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 29. Id. at 437-38. 
 30. Id. at 438. 
 31. Id. at 438-39. 
 32. Id. at 441-43. 
 33. Id. at 443. 
 34. Id. at 442. 
 35. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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the phone numbers a person dialed.  Because these devices were installed at 
the phone company, rather than inside a person’s home, and because people 
“know that they must convey numerical information to the phone 
company,” they cannot “harbor any general expectation that the numbers 
they dial will remain secret.”36 
The third party doctrine presents one of the most serious threats to 
privacy in the digital age.  Today, a multitude of companies have records of 
personal information.  Internet service providers (“ISPs”) have information 
that connects a person’s identity to pseudonymous postings on the Internet.  
Bookstores and merchants such as Amazon.com keep extensive records of 
every purchase a person makes.  The government no longer needs to enter a 
person’s home to see what they have bought—it can get the data from the 
records of the companies that sold them the items.  The government can 
find out whom a person has been talking to by examining ISP records and 
phone records.  In the Information Age, so much of what we do is recorded 
by third parties that the Court’s third party doctrine increasingly renders the 
Fourth Amendment ineffective in protecting people’s privacy against 
government information gathering.37 
How should the decline of the Fourth Amendment be understood?  One 
part of the explanation is that the Supreme Court has been backing away 
from the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, as the Court today 
is far more conservative than the Warren Court.  But the Court’s narrow 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection can also be understood as being 
rooted in a flawed conception of privacy.  The Court has moved from one 
impoverished understanding of privacy to another.  Back in the days of 
Olmstead, the Court viewed privacy in terms of physical invasions—for 
example, probing baggage and searching homes and tangible things.38  Katz 
recognized that, as in the case of wiretapping, a person’s privacy could be 
invaded even though there was not an actual physical invasion.  But the 
Court then latched onto another conception of privacy—the secrecy 
paradigm—which has proven to be equally, if not more, restrictive than the 
Court’s conception of privacy in Olmstead. 
 
 36. Id. at 743. 
 37. See Solove, Digital Person, supra note 22, at 200-03.  Because so many investigatory 
technologies, tools, and techniques fall outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment, 
commentators have long lamented the waning of Fourth Amendment protection. Morgan 
Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution:  The Supreme Court, Technology and the 
Fourth Amendment, 72 Miss. L.J. 5, 49 (2002); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ 
Privacy:  The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1325, 1326 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth 
Amendment:  Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 
Minn. L. Rev. 1393, 1411 (2002); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the 
Twenty-First Century:  Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 125, 130-33 (2002).  For more articles, see Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, 
at 802, 803 & n.7. 
 38. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
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C.  The Rise of the Statutes 
Enter Congress.  The rules regulating government investigations have 
increasingly been those of federal statutes, not Fourth Amendment law.  
Although the third party doctrine eliminated Fourth Amendment protection 
from a wide range of government information-gathering activities, 
numerous federal statutes now fill the void.  Wiretapping, for example, 
despite being covered by the Fourth Amendment, is largely regulated 
through the Wiretap Act.39 
Some of the federal statutes were enacted in response to the Court’s 
failure to apply the Fourth Amendment to particular situations.40  Other 
statues were primarily enacted to protect consumer privacy and regulate 
various businesses, but they also contain provisions for government access 
to records and personal information.41  A brief tour of these statutes 
demonstrates that they are far from a trivial part of criminal procedure.  
Indeed, statutory law is becoming increasingly relevant in the Information 
Age. 
1.  Electronic Surveillance Law 
In most circumstances, statutes have filled the gaps left by the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Wiretap Act, however, is one of the rare statutes that 
regulates in an area that the Court has found to be within the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection.  The original version of the Wiretap Act 
was enacted as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
in 1968.42  This was one year after Katz had concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to wiretapping43 and Berger v. New York had set forth 
the constitutional requirements for wiretapping.44  Berger and Katz were 
used “as a guide in drafting Title III.”45 
The Wiretap Act has all but supplanted the Fourth Amendment in 
regulating wiretaps, because the protections of the Wiretap Act exceed 
those of the Fourth Amendment in many circumstances.  For example, 
unlike the Fourth Amendment, the Wiretap Act’s applicability does not 
hinge upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.46  Furthermore, while the 
Fourth Amendment only applies to government officials, the Wiretap Act 
 
 39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000); see also infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text. 
 40. See infra notes 52-78 and accompanying text. 
 41. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 42. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2520). 
 43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also supra notes 19-21 and 
accompanying text. 
 44. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967) (stating that wiretap orders must 
particularly describe the kinds of conversations sought to be overhead and must have a 
termination date). 
 45. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 214-18 (1969). 
 46. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511. 
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applies to government officials as well as to private parties.47  Warrants 
under the Wiretap Act have certain protections that Fourth Amendment 
warrants lack, and Orin Kerr aptly refers to Wiretap Act warrants as 
“‘super’ search warrant[s].”48  For example, beyond requiring probable 
cause, they require a finding that “normal investigative procedures have 
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if 
tried or to be too dangerous.”49  Only certain high-ranking government 
officials are permitted to apply for warrants under the Wiretap Act.50 
The Stored Communications Act protects communications stored by 
third parties, including ISP records.  The Stored Communications Act was 
enacted as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) of 
1986.51  The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail stored with third 
parties, or in subscriber information stored with an ISP.  There is an 
argument that this information, because it is maintained by a third party, 
would fall under the third party doctrine.52  The Stored Communications 
Act protects unread e-mail awaiting download by the user that is 
temporarily stored at one’s ISP.53  In addition, the government must obtain 
a warrant to acquire communications stored for 180 days or less.54  After 
180 days, however, the protection drops to a mere subpoena or court 
order.55 
The Stored Communications Act also regulates ISP customer records.  
ISP records contain information that links a customer’s screen name (online 
pseudonym) with her real identity.  These records also include Internet 
session times, addresses, phone numbers, and billing data.56  To obtain ISP 
records, the government needs to secure a court order under the Stored 
Communications Act, which does not require a showing of probable 
cause.57  Rather, the government only has to demonstrate “specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds” to believe 
 
 47. Id. § 2511(1). 
 48. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act:  The Big Brother 
That Isn’t, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 607, 621 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Big Brother]. 
 49. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). 
 50. Id. § 2516. 
 51. Id. §§ 2510-2522. 
 52. See generally supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text. 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17). 
 54. Id. § 2703(a). 
 55. Id. § 2703(b). 
 56. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(C). 
 57. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(B)(ii). 
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communications are “relevant” to the criminal investigation.58  The Stored 
Communications Act does not have an exclusionary rule.59 
The Pen Register Act regulates government access to pen registers and 
trap and trace devices,60 which, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court 
held are outside the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.61  Under the Pen 
Register Act, the government must obtain a court order to use a pen register 
or trap and trace device.62  However, a court order differs significantly from 
a search warrant.  The order requires that the government certify that “the 
information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to 
an ongoing investigation.”63  This standard falls well short of probable 
cause, as relevance is much easier to establish.  Moreover, courts have no 
discretion; when government officials make the certification, the order must 
be granted.64  There is no exclusionary rule under the Pen Register Act. 
Congress has also regulated foreign intelligence surveillance.  In 1972, 
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment standard for national 
security intelligence remained an open question.  In United States v. United 
States District Court,65 a case that has become known as the “Keith case,” 
the Court ruled that, although surveillance for domestic criminal law 
enforcement was protected by ordinary Fourth Amendment rules, “domestic 
security surveillance may involve different policy and practical 
considerations from the surveillance of ‘ordinary crime.’”66  The Court also 
noted that “[d]ifferent standards” other than a warrant “may be compatible 
with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the 
legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the 
protected rights of our citizens.”67  Moreover, the Court explicitly left open 
the question of the surveillance of “foreign powers,” opining that 
warrantless surveillance under these limited circumstances “may be 
constitutional.”68 
Keith left more questions than answers.  In part to fill the gaps left by 
Keith, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) 
 
 58. Id. § 2703(d).  If the government does not want to provide prior notice to the 
subscriber that it is seeking the information, it must obtain a warrant. Id. § 2703(b).  
However, in a number of circumstances, notice can be delayed for up to three months after 
information has been obtained. Id. § 2705. 
 59. United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1111 (D. Kan. 2000); United States 
v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 1999). 
 60. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3124. 
 61. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. § 3123(a)(1). 
 65. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 66. Id. at 322. 
 67. Id. at 322-23. 
 68. Id. at 322 n.20. 
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of 1978.69  FISA’s purpose is to create a regulatory regime for foreign 
intelligence gathering.70  FISA creates a secret court of eleven judges to 
issue court orders for government foreign intelligence-gathering activities.71  
FISA orders are granted if there is probable cause to believe that the 
monitored party is a “foreign power” or “an agent of a foreign power.”72  
Evidence obtained under a FISA order can be used in a regular criminal 
prosecution.73 
Very soon after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress 
passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA-PATRIOT 
Act”) of 2001.74  The USA-PATRIOT Act made a number of changes to 
the federal statutes discussed above.  It expanded the definition of pen 
registers from “numbers dialed . . . on the telephone line” to all “dialing, 
routing, addressing, or signaling information.”75  This expansion means that 
the Pen Register Act now covers the addressing information on e-mails, 
Internet Protocol addresses (“IP addresses”), and Uniform Resource 
Locators (“URLs”). 
The USA-PATRIOT Act also expanded the information that could be 
obtained under the Stored Communications Act, adding “records of session 
times and durations,” “any temporarily assigned network address,” and 
“any credit card or bank account number” used for payment.76  Moreover, 
the USA-PATRIOT Act expanded the scope of FISA.  FISA originally 
applied only when “the purpose” of the investigation was to gather foreign 
intelligence.77  This limited FISA’s scope to when the primary purpose of 
an investigation was foreign intelligence gathering.  FISA now applies 
whenever foreign intelligence gathering is “a significant purpose” of the 
 
 69. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1801-1811 (2000)). 
 70. The purpose of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) was to erect a 
“secure framework by which the Executive Branch may conduct legitimate electronic 
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the context of this Nation’s 
commitment to privacy and individual rights.” S. Rep. No. 604 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3916. 
 71. Originally, there were seven judges on the court, but the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
(“USA-PATRIOT Act”) raised the number to eleven. See USA-PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-56, § 208(i), 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)).  For 
more details about the workings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), see 
Benjamin Wittes, Inside America’s Most Secretive Court, 143 N.J. L.J. 777 (1996). 
 72. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
 73. Id. § 1806(b). 
 74. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62). 
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000), amended by USA-PATRIOT Act § 216, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
3127(3) (West 2005). 
 76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(c)(2). 
 77. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A). 
    
758 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
investigation.78  This means that foreign intelligence gathering only needs 
to be one of the goals of an investigation, thereby allowing the government 
to use FISA to obtain information for criminal prosecution purposes. 
2.  Regulation of Government Access to Records 
In the void left by the third party doctrine, Congress has established a 
regime to regulate government access to records.  Such a regime has been 
constructed piecemeal.  Many of the provisions that address law 
enforcement access appear in various statutes that primarily deal with 
consumer and financial privacy, and are not primarily devoted to law 
enforcement issues. 
In 1978, two years after the Supreme Court concluded in United States v. 
Miller that the Fourth Amendment did not cover bank records, Congress 
responded by passing the Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”).79  The 
RFPA requires the government to use a subpoena to access financial 
information.80  The subpoena requires a “reason to believe that the records 
sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.”81  People must 
be given prior notice of the subpoena so they can challenge it in court; 
however, in many circumstances, the government can delay notice.82 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) of 1970, although primarily a 
consumer privacy protection statute, contains provisions regarding law 
enforcement access to credit records.83  Credit reporting agencies maintain 
detailed records on nearly every American citizen.  These records include 
not only financial information, but also data about people’s lifestyles, 
spending habits, and anything else relevant to creditors.84  Under the 
FCRA, a consumer reporting agency “may furnish identifying information 
respecting any consumer, limited to his name, address, former addresses, 
places of employment, and former places of employment, to a governmental 
agency.”85  When the government wants to obtain other information, it must 
seek a court order or grand jury subpoena.86  Furthermore, the Federal 
 
 78. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B), amended by USA-PATRIOT Act § 204, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
1804(a)(7)(B). 
 79. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-
630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000)). 
 80. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422.  For more information on the Right to Financial 
Privacy (“RFPA”), see George B. Trubow & Dennis L. Hudson, The Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978:  New Protection from Federal Intrusion, 12 J. Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 
487 (1979). 
 81. 12 U.S.C. § 3407. 
 82. Id. § 3409. 
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
 84. Solove, Digital Person, supra note 22, at 21. 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 1681f. 
 86. Id. § 1681b(a)(1). 
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Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) can request a list of all financial institutions 
where a person maintains an account.87 
The Family Education Right to Privacy Act (“FERPA”) of 1974 protects 
the privacy of school records, which can include extensive information 
about students.88  Law enforcement officials may obtain these records 
“pursuant to any lawfully issued subpoena.”89 
The Cable Communications Policy Act (“CCPA”) of 1984, which 
regulates the privacy of a person’s records with her cable television 
company, is another statute designed to protect consumer privacy.90  Like 
many others, the CCPA also contains a provision for law enforcement 
access to cable records.91  The government must establish “clear and 
convincing evidence that the subject of the information is reasonably 
suspected of engaging in criminal activity and that the information sought 
would be material evidence in the case.”92  People can “appear and contest” 
the court order.93  There is, however, no exclusionary rule under the CCPA. 
The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) of 1988,94 primarily a 
consumer privacy statute, enables law enforcement officials to obtain a 
person’s videotape rental records from her video store pursuant to a grand 
jury subpoena or court order.95  Similarly, the regulations promulgated 
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) 
of 199696 permit law enforcement officials to access medical records with a 
court order or subpoena.97  Law enforcement officials need only ask for the 
information “for the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive, 
material witness, or missing person.”98 
3.  Searches Involving Communicative Material   
Congress has also regulated searches involving communicative material, 
such as documents used for the purpose of engaging in journalism or public 
communication, as well as correspondence and letters in the mail.  In 1978, 
in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,99 police searched the offices of a newspaper 
to find photographs of people involved in a demonstration.100  The 
newspaper was not involved in the demonstration and was not suspected of 
 
 87. Id. § 1681u. 
 88. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000). 
 89. Id. § 1232g(b)(2)(B). 
 90. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000). 
 91. Id. § 551(h). 
 92. Id. § 551(h)(1). 
 93. Id. § 551(h)(2). 
 94. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000). 
 95. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(C). 
 96. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1183, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2000); see 45 C.F.R. § 160-64 (2004). 
 97. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(A). 
 98. Id. § 164.512(f)(2). 
 99. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
 100. Id. at 551. 
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criminal activity.101  The Court concluded that the law enforcement 
officials could conduct the search if the officials had probable cause to 
believe that evidence of a crime would be located at the property.102  The 
Court concluded that the requirements of a warrant “should afford sufficient 
protection” against these harms.103 
In response to Zurcher, Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act 
(“PPA”) of 1980.104  The PPA restricts the search or seizure of “any work 
product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a 
purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other 
similar form of public communication.”105  The PPA requires that the 
government obtain a subpoena for work product materials, allowing the 
opposing party to challenge the request in court and to produce the 
requested documents without having the police search the premises. 
Statutory law also regulates the search and seizure of postal mail.106  In 
this area, the Supreme Court in 1877 held that the Fourth Amendment 
requires a search warrant in order for law enforcement officials to open 
letters and parcels.107  A federal statute overlaps with this holding, requiring 
a search warrant before law enforcement officials can open a letter.108 
II.  CONGRESS VERSUS THE COURTS 
The previous part demonstrated that, for a significant portion of criminal 
investigations, especially those involving information, a regime of federal 
statutes—rather than the Fourth Amendment—governs.  Orin Kerr is one of 
the few to have analyzed the implications of this profound shift from 
constitutional to statutory regulation of government investigations.109  Kerr 
contends that legislative rules are in many respects preferable to judicial 
ones, and he goes on to argue that “the legislative branch rather than the 
judiciary should create the primary investigative rules when technology is 
changing.”110  Legislatures, according to Kerr, “offer significant 
institutional advantages over courts.”111  Accordingly, “[c]ourts should 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 554. 
 103. Id. at 565. 
 104. Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000aa (2000)). 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a). 
 106. 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d) (2000). 
 107. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
 108. 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d). 
 109. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 807. 
 110. Id. at 806; see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd:  Reclaiming Security and 
Freedom in an Anxious Age 210-11 (2004) (“Congress is better suited than the courts to 
strike a reasonable balance between liberty and security”) (discussing Kerr’s thesis). 
 111. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 807-08. 
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recognize their institutional limitations and remain cautious until the 
relevant technology and its applications stabilize.”112 
What does Kerr mean by invoking the language of judicial “caution”?  
The language is that of deference, which is also referred to as judicial 
restraint.  Elsewhere, I have critiqued the underpinnings used to justify 
judicial deference, concluding that “[d]eference is the negation of critical 
inquiry.”113  Kerr is unclear in his article about what precisely judges 
should do when faced with applying the Fourth Amendment to a new 
technology.  One interpretation of Kerr’s call for “caution” is for judges to 
be more reluctant to find the Fourth Amendment applicable to new 
technologies—in other words, to conclude that, when law enforcement 
activities involve new technologies, they fall outside of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection.  Because Fourth Amendment applicability turns 
on whether or not there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, perhaps Kerr 
is suggesting that courts should be reluctant to find a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  As Kerr notes, “[j]udicial deference has often invited 
Congressional regulation.”114  Therefore, the most deferential position 
courts can take is simply to hold that the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply, and allow Congress to fill the void. 
The question becomes the following:  Should courts be more bold in 
expanding the scope of the Fourth Amendment to encompass new 
technologies?  Or should courts cautiously hold off and allow legislatures to 
craft the regulation?  The next part of this Article argues that Kerr is too 
quick to extol the virtues of Congress and that he is especially misguided in 
suggesting that courts take a back seat to legislatures in creating criminal 
procedure rules for new technologies. 
A.  Are Legislative Rules Better than Judicial Rules? 
Kerr makes a number of arguments in support of his call for judicial 
restraint.  Kerr’s key contentions are that (1) legislatures create rules that 
are more comprehensive, balanced, clear, and flexible; (2) legislatures are 
better able to keep up with technological change; and (3) legislatures are 
more adept at understanding complex new technologies.115  The following 
sections examine each contention in turn. 
 
 112. Id. at 808. 
 113. Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain:  Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of 
Rights, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 941, 1020 (1999) [hereinafter Solove, The Darkest Domain]. 
 114. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 806. 
 115. Specifically, he argues as follows:  “When technologies are new and their impact 
remains uncertain, statutory rules governing law enforcement powers will tend to be more 
sophisticated, comprehensive, forward-thinking, and flexible than rules created by the 
judicial branch.” Id. at 859-60. 
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1.  Creating a Comprehensive and Balanced Set of Rules 
Kerr argues that a key goal in drafting criminal procedure rules is to 
create “a rule-structure that simultaneously respects privacy interests and 
law enforcement needs.”116  According to Kerr, unlike courts, 
“[l]egislatures can enact comprehensive rules based on expert input and can 
update them frequently as technology changes.”117  Moreover, legislative 
rules “are more nuanced, clear, and . . . optimize the critical balance 
between privacy and public safety more effectively when technology is in 
flux.”118 
However, there seems to be no reason why a statutory regime will 
inevitably be any more comprehensive, balanced, or clear than a regime 
based on Fourth Amendment principles.  When the Fourth Amendment 
covers a particular law enforcement activity, it provides a set of rules to 
regulate it.  Once a law enforcement activity falls within the Fourth 
Amendment’s regulatory regime, courts will examine whether the search or 
seizure was “reasonable.”119  A search with a warrant supported by 
probable cause is generally reasonable.  Only on very rare occasions are 
searches pursuant to a valid warrant unreasonable.120  A search without a 
valid warrant is often deemed unreasonable.  This is known as the “per se 
warrant rule.”121 
Warrants are a judicial authorization for a particular search.  Warrants 
must be supported by probable cause, which exists when there is 
“reasonably trustworthy information” that the search will turn up evidence 
of a crime.122  The purpose of a warrant is to have an independent party 
(judges or magistrates) ensure that government officials really do have 
probable cause to conduct a search. 
Kerr criticizes the Fourth Amendment rules as inflexible, but in reality 
they show a remarkable degree of flexibility.  First, the warrant requirement 
balances privacy interests and law enforcement needs by allowing searches 
and seizures to occur only after law enforcement officials justify them 
before a judge or magistrate. 
Second, in situations where warrants and probable cause do not work 
well, the Court has made exceptions.  Indeed, there are numerous 
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements, such as Terry 
 
 116. Id. at 861. 
 117. Id. at 807. 
 118. Id. at 806. 
 119. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 120. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (operating on the defendant to retrieve a 
bullet inside his body was an unreasonable search, even though there was a valid warrant for 
it). 
 121. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1083, 1118 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers]. 
 122. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
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stops, exigent circumstances, and “special needs” in schools and 
workplaces.123  These exceptions allow the courts to accommodate a wide 
range of government investigative activity within the protective framework 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
In contrast, the statutory regime that Kerr extols has many deficiencies 
that caution against Kerr’s enthusiasm for legislative rules.  When the 
statutes are examined as a whole—as an alternative regulatory regime to the 
Fourth Amendment—there are many severe problems that refute Kerr’s 
belief in the superiority of a legislative regime.124 
First, Congress’s statutes lack effective remedies because the federal 
statutes often lack exclusionary rules.  For example, there is no 
exclusionary rule to protect e-mail under the Wiretap Act,125 and the Stored 
Communications Act and Pen Register Act both lack an exclusionary 
rule.126  Kerr, in fact, wrote an article lamenting exactly this fact.127  Most 
of the statutes regulating law enforcement access to records held by third 
parties also lack an exclusionary rule.128  As a result, there is often little 
incentive for criminal defendants to challenge violations of these statutes. 
Second, there are many gaps in the statutes.  Consider electronic 
surveillance law, for example.  The Wiretap Act fails to cover silent video 
surveillance.129  As one court observed, 
 
 123. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-20 (1987) (holding that, when a 
government employer conducts a warrantless search, a court “must balance the invasion of 
the employee’s legitimate expectation of privacy against the government’s need for 
supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 340 (1984) (stating that a warrant requirement is unsuited to the school 
environment, despite children’s expectations of privacy); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 
(1968) (holding that an investigatory stop without a warrant is justified when a police officer 
is “able to point to specific and articulable facts which . . . reasonably warrant that 
intrusion”). 
 124. In his reply, Kerr contends that I unfairly pit an idealized Fourth Amendment regime 
against the statutory regime.  In other words, I am comparing a Fourth Amendment regime 
as if the courts had applied the Fourth Amendment to various new technologies against the 
statutory regime as is.  But Kerr’s contention is normative and proscriptive in that he 
recommends that going forward, legislatures, and not courts, should be the primary 
rulemakers.  He criticizes scholars who call for the courts to expand Fourth Amendment 
applicability.  The current status quo reveals areas where the courts refused to apply the 
Fourth Amendment and where legislatures became involved.  I aim to ask, are we better off 
with the void as filled by the legislative rules, or would we be better off had the Fourth 
Amendment been interpreted to encompass a particular law enforcement activity?  I believe 
in many instances, the latter would be better. 
 125. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000). 
 126. See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000); Pen Register Act, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000). 
 127. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance:  How a Suppression 
Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 Hastings L.J. 805 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, 
Fog]. 
 128. See generally supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text. 
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 539 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 
508 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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Television surveillance is identical in its indiscriminate character to 
wiretapping and bugging.  It is even more invasive of privacy, just as a 
strip search is more invasive than a pat-down search, but it is not more 
indiscriminate: the microphone is as “dumb” as the television camera; 
both devices pick up anything within their electronic reach, however 
irrelevant to the investigation.130 
As another court observed, “[V]ideo surveillance can be vastly more 
intrusive [than audio surveillance], as demonstrated by the surveillance in 
this case that recorded a person masturbating before the hidden camera.”131 
Beyond video surveillance, there are numerous technologies Congress 
has failed to regulate.  Global positioning systems enable people’s 
movements to be tracked wherever they go.132  Facial recognition systems 
can enable surveillance photos and videos to be scanned to identify 
particular people based on their facial features.133  Satellite technology may 
be used to examine practically any open area on earth.134  Radio frequency 
identification (“RFID”) involves tags placed into products, objects, and 
even human beings that emit a decipherable signal.135  As this technology 
develops and tags can be read at greater distances, RFID might be used to 
track people’s movements. 
Congress has not passed statutes to address the privacy implications of 
any of these technologies.  Nor has Congress passed a law to regulate video 
surveillance of citizens.  Ironically, FISA regulates video surveillance, but 
the ECPA does not,136 meaning that the video surveillance of a foreign spy 
receives more federal statutory protection than that of a U.S. citizen.137  Nor 
has Congress regulated the use of tracking devices, key logging devices, or 
other new technologies. 
Kerr critiques the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kyllo v. United States138 as 
the exemplar of the shortcomings of judicial rules for regulating 
 
 130. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted). 
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 133. Daniel J. Solove & Marc Rotenberg, Information Privacy Law 313 (2003). 
 134. See Mark Monmonier, Spying with Maps:  Surveillance Technology and the Future 
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 135. Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2055, 
2060 (2004); Jonathan Krim, Embedding Their Hopes in RFID:  Tagging Technology 
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 136. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000). 
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the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) does not cover silent video 
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508 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 138. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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technology.139  Kyllo involved the use of thermal sensors by law 
enforcement officials to detect marijuana heat lamps inside a person’s 
home.140  The Court held that the Fourth Amendment required a search 
warrant before using such devices to detect activities inside a person’s 
home.141  Kerr argues that “the [Kyllo] opinion captures the prevailing 
zeitgeist about law, technology, and privacy.  When technology threatens 
privacy, the thinking goes, the courts and the Constitution should offer the 
primary response.”142 
Kyllo sets forth the Court’s current approach to analyzing sensory 
enhancement technology:  When the technology is not in general public use 
and is used to detect activities in the home, a warrant is required.143  This 
does leave open many questions:  What happens when technology enters 
general public use?  What about uses beyond the home? 
Certainly, Kyllo has problems in articulating a clear approach to when 
sensory enhancement technology can be employed.  But was Congress any 
better?  Congress has never passed a law addressing sensory enhancement 
technologies, despite having had a long time to do so.  Back in 1986, the 
Supreme Court held in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States144 that the 
Fourth Amendment did not apply to highly magnified photographs taken 
from a high-tech aerial camera at very high altitudes.  The Court reasoned 
as follows:  “The mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at 
least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems.”145  
The Dow Chemical case raised a host of questions about what limits, if any, 
should be placed on sensory enhancement technology.  The Court 
cautiously refused to impose a rule to regulate such technologies.  Congress 
could have responded with legislation, but it did not.  There is little reason, 
therefore, to assume that if the courts hold that the Fourth Amendment is 
inapplicable to a new technology, Congress will swoop in and save the day. 
Beyond electronic surveillance law, the law regulating government 
access to records held by third parties also has tremendous gaps.  Although 
the RFPA and the FCRA regulate government access to financial data,146 
there are many situations where financial data is unprotected, such as when 
the information is held by employers, landlords, merchants, creditors, 
database companies, and others.147  HIPAA regulates access to medical 
records, but only when in the hands of certain third parties (doctors, 
 
 139. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 802. 
 140. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29. 
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 143. Kyllo,  533 U.S. at 40. 
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 145. Id. at 228. 
 146. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000); Fair Credit 
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hospitals, insurers, and so on).148  Medical websites containing people’s 
personal information are not covered by HIPAA.149  Basically, the problem 
is that the statutes focus on who is holding the information, rather than on 
the information itself.  Thus, the same piece of information can be protected 
if held by one third party and completely unprotected if held by a different 
third party.  Some third parties that have extensive information about 
individuals are not covered at all, including bookstores, merchants, 
restaurants, employers, and other businesses.  There are numerous database 
companies that compile extensive dossiers on individuals, yet existing 
statutes often do not cover law enforcement access to this data. 
Second, beyond enormous gaps in protection, the statutes offer far less 
protection than the Fourth Amendment.  Most permit law enforcement 
access to information based only on a court order or subpoena, rather than 
on a warrant.150  Prosecutors, not judges, issue the subpoenas.151  Professor 
William Stuntz observed as follows:  “[W]hile searches typically require 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion and sometimes require a warrant, 
subpoenas require nothing, save that the subpoena not be unreasonably 
burdensome to its target.  Few burdens are deemed unreasonable.”152  The 
court orders required by the statutes also require far less than probable 
cause.  Typically, mere “relevance” to an ongoing criminal investigation is 
all that such statutes require.153 
Thus, in areas where the courts have backed off and left a void that 
Congress has attempted to fill, the statutes have not, in large part, measured 
up.  Given a choice, it seems that a better balance between privacy interests 
and law enforcement needs could have been reached if the courts had held 
that the Fourth Amendment covered a particular law enforcement activity.  
Thus, we could have the courts take Kerr’s advice and exercise caution and 
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restraint, allowing Congress to craft the rules, or we could have the courts 
be more willing to expand the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.  Where 
the courts have left open areas for legislative rules to fill in, Congress has 
created an uneven fabric of protections that is riddled with holes and that 
has weak protections in numerous places.  Therefore, Kerr’s claim that 
legislatures create more comprehensive and balanced rules than courts is 
simply not borne out by the evidence. 
Another of Kerr’s reasons for preferring legislatures to courts is his view 
that legislatures will craft clearer rules than courts.  Kerr is particularly keen 
on avoiding unclear rules, and he lists “rule clarity” as a key goal for a 
criminal procedure system.154  Kerr argues that “[u]nclear rules mean 
unclear limits on government power, increasing the likelihood of abuses by 
aggressive government officials.”155  According to Kerr, legislative rules 
“are more nuanced, clear, and . . . optimize the critical balance between 
privacy and public safety more effectively when technology is in flux.”156 
Yet the rules of the ECPA are notoriously confusing and unclear, as Kerr 
himself frequently points out in his writings.157  If electronic surveillance 
law were clear, Kerr would have a lot less to write about.  He has written 
countless articles seeking to explain the meaning of the electronic 
surveillance laws,158 and has built his reputation as one of the few people 
on the planet who can actually make sense of the law.  It is no wonder that 
Kerr prefers the statutes; this is his home turf.  As for clarity, there are 
many open questions under electronic surveillance law, and many 
provisions subject to conflicting interpretations.  Kerr really does not point 
us to a clearer regime; rather, he simply points us to one that he understands 
better. 
Furthermore, federal statutes are not self-executing, meaning that they 
must be interpreted and applied by courts.  In reality, Kerr’s argument 
concerns only whether Fourth Amendment rules interpreted by judges are 
preferable to statutory rules interpreted by judges.  In fact, judges have 
frequently botched interpreting statutory law, as Kerr repeatedly has 
lamented.159  A large part of the problem is that the statutory law is 
extremely complicated.  For instance, Kerr’s favorite law, the ECPA, is 
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immensely complicated, and he notes that it is “unusually difficult to 
understand.”160  He also observes that the “law of electronic surveillance is 
famously complex, if not entirely impenetrable.”161  The problem, then, is 
not the Fourth Amendment, but the outdated, overly complex statutes that 
courts must apply. 
Part of the problem with the complexity of electronic surveillance law 
stems from the flexibility that Kerr praises.  Kerr commends Congress for 
dreaming up eight different kinds of “statutory thresholds” for electronic 
surveillance law.162  While this certainly is more flexible, it has also led to 
great confusion.  Kerr has painstakingly attempted to explain these different 
standards, which are readily confused and difficult to figure out.163  Not 
only federal officials, but also local law enforcement officials, must 
understand these standards.  Most local police officers, however, lack the 
benefit of having years to study the mysteries of the ECPA. 
The problem is that flexibility and clarity are often in conflict.  The 
multiple exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, which give the Fourth Amendment rules some 
flexibility, have been criticized as confusing.  As Silas Wasserstrom and 
Louis Michael Seidman observe, the per se warrant rule is “so riddled with 
exceptions, complexities, and contradictions that it has become a trap for 
the unwary.”164 
The problems of clarity and flexibility are endemic to all rules, whether 
legislative or judicial.  An examination of the current law, however, far 
from revealing legislative superiority in achieving clarity and flexibility, 
demonstrates that both legislatures and courts are for the most part in the 
same boat. 
2.  Keeping Up with Technological Change 
Kerr argues that legislatures are better able than courts to craft rules 
dealing with changing facts.  According to Kerr, courts, unlike legislatures, 
“cannot update rules quickly as technology shifts.”165  Kerr argues that a 
key difference between legislative and judicial rules is that “legislatures 
typically create generally applicable rules ex ante, while courts tend to 
create rules ex post in a case-by-case fashion.”166  Kerr goes on to argue 
that “legislatures enact generalized rules for the future, whereas courts 
resolve disputes settling the rights of parties from a past event.  The 
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difference leads to Fourth Amendment rules that tend to lag behind parallel 
statutory rules and current technologies by at least a decade.”167 
The same is true, however, for the statutory law.  The problem with ex 
ante laws is that they cannot anticipate all of the new and changing factual 
situations that technology brings about.  Ex post rules, in contrast, are often 
much better tailored to specific types of technology, because such rules 
arise as technology changes, rather than beforehand. 
Kerr points to a series of gaps in Fourth Amendment law—areas where 
no court has made a determination as to whether the Fourth Amendment 
applies to a particular technology.  He observes that pen registers “were in 
widespread use by the 1960s, but the Supreme Court did not pass on 
whether their use violated the Fourth Amendment until 1979.”168  Congress, 
however, waited even longer, and did not spring into action until 1986.169 
Kerr continues his argument by pointing out that “no Article III court at 
any level has decided whether an Internet user has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their e-mails stored with an Internet service provider; whether 
encryption creates a reasonable expectation of privacy; or what the Fourth 
Amendment implications of . . . Internet surveillance . . . might be.”170 
This is true, but has Congress addressed these topics?  Congress has yet 
to pass a statute addressing whether law enforcement officials must obtain a 
warrant or court order to decode encrypted files they have seized.  
Regarding privacy in e-mail, the Stored Communications Act is unclear 
about the level of protection provided to e-mail that is already read by the 
user, but left on the ISP’s server.171  Such a situation is increasing in its 
frequency, due to the rise of web-based e-mail systems such as Gmail, 
Hotmail, and Yahoo e-mail, where people’s e-mail remains stored at the 
server and not deleted after it is read.  The Department of Justice takes the 
position that read e-mail is “simply a remotely stored file” that can be 
obtained with a mere subpoena.172  This position was articulated in a 
manual written by none other than Orin Kerr.173  Many other contested 
questions of electronic surveillance law remain.174 
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According to Kerr, legislatures are superior to courts in these situations 
because legislatures “can act at any time, even when a technology is new” 
and “recent history suggests that legislatures usually act at a surprisingly 
early stage, and certainly long before the courts.”175  Such a history is 
haphazard at best, as there are numerous forms of technology legislatures 
have not acted on.  Kerr does not provide any structural reason why 
legislatures can act earlier, or why creating a law before technology is fully 
understood or developed is necessarily a good thing.  Often the problem 
with ex ante legislative rules is that technology changes afterwards. 
Kerr notes that courts would need to “change the governing rules at 
regular intervals” in order to “allow the governing rules to change as needed 
over time.”176  He then states that “it’s hard to imagine the courts creating 
new rules every few years to keep the law up to date.”177  Congress, 
however, has not done a good job of this, and its rules regulating electronic 
surveillance are hopelessly out of date.  Throughout the entire twentieth 
century and continuing on through the present, there have been only a few 
times Congress has made major changes in electronic surveillance law:  in 
1934, 1968, 1978, 1986, and 2001.178 
First, in 1934, Congress enacted § 605 of the Federal Communications 
Act179 to regulate wiretapping six years after the Court held in Olmstead 
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply.180  Although Kerr complains that 
the Court took a very long time to address wiretapping, Congress took even 
longer.  And when it finally did address wiretapping with § 605, the law 
was a disaster.  Dislike of § 605 was nearly universal.181  Section 605, 
which governed wiretapping for longer than any other federal statute, struck 
a terrible balance by anyone’s standards.  Section 605 requires as follows:  
“[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any 
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, 
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any 
person.”182  Section 605 did not specify how it was to be enforced, and it 
took the courts to fix this ambiguity and conclude that evidence obtained in 
violation of the Act would be excluded from evidence in federal court.183  
The Department of Justice and the FBI interpreted § 605 to prohibit only 
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the disclosure of evidence at trial, not the practice of wiretapping itself.184  
This enabled FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to wiretap to his heart’s content 
so long as he used wiretapping only to blackmail people, rather than to 
provide evidence in federal trials. 
Second, in 1968, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act to regulate electronic surveillance and reform 
the misguided regime of § 605.185  By this time, however, the Court had 
already overruled Olmstead and had provided useful guidance to Congress 
about what to include in its law in Berger.186 
Third, in 1978, Congress enacted FISA to regulate foreign intelligence 
gathering.187  FISA created a regime distinct from that of Title III, which 
governed domestic surveillance.188 
Fourth, in 1986, Congress revised Title III with the ECPA, which was 
Congress’s most proactive legislation.189  Although the ECPA was grand in 
scope, Congress has done little to modernize the ECPA in the nearly two 
decades since its passage. 
Finally, in 2001, Congress passed the USA-PATRIOT Act.190  Kerr 
trumpets the virtues of legislatures having time to explore the facts and 
really understand the technologies, but the USA-PATRIOT Act was rushed 
through Congress in great haste.191  Moreover, without the tragic events of 
September 11, it is unlikely that Congress would have made any significant 
changes to electronic surveillance law in 2001. 
This is hardly a regular updating of the law.  Although the ECPA has 
been amended between 1986 and 2001, Kerr admits elsewhere that these 
“subsequent changes have merely nibbled around the edges of the law.”192  
For the domestic surveillance regime, there had been a lag of thirty-four 
years between § 605 and Title III, eighteen years between Title III and the 
ECPA, and fifteen years between the ECPA and the USA-PATRIOT Act.  
If anything, this historical record suggests that Congress is actually far 
worse than the courts in reacting to new technologies.  The ex ante law of 
the ECPA that Kerr extols now has many spots where it no longer fits the 
technology.193  Since the passage of the ECPA, technology has not sat still.  
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E-mail has flourished.  The Internet has blossomed.  Cyberspace has 
transformed our lives.  Whereas at one point, before the frequent use of e-
mail and the Internet, the ECPA might have been a visionary ex ante law, it 
has since become quite outdated. 
This history should not be surprising.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine 
Congress keeping statutes up to date.  Federal legislation is not easy to pass, 
and it usually takes a dramatic event to spark interest in creating or updating 
a law.  Congress often only gets involved when there is a major uproar or 
problem, and unless there is a strong impetus, little new lawmaking occurs.  
In contrast, courts must get involved every time an issue arises in a case.  
As a result, issues are likely to be addressed with more frequency in the 
courts than in Congress.  Kerr has it exactly backwards.   
3.  Comprehending Complex Technologies 
A basic premise in Kerr’s reasoning is that new technologies are complex 
and difficult to understand, and legislatures are better equipped to deal with 
such complexities.  Specifically, he argues that courts “lack the information 
needed to understand how the specific technologies in cases before them fit 
into the broader spectrum of changing technologies.”194 
There is no reason, however, to assume that the average legislator can 
better understand technology than the average judge.  There may be a few 
in Congress with a good understanding of the technology, but many lack the 
foggiest idea about how new technologies work. 
Moreover, in many cases, the technologies at issue are not particularly 
complex.  Do we really need two years and thousands of pages of detailed 
information to understand how e-mail works?  If understanding e-mail 
required knowledge of quantum physics, Kerr’s argument would have more 
resonance.  In fact, Congress’s electronic surveillance law is infinitely more 
complex than the technologies it seeks to regulate. 
Expert testimony or an amicus brief can adequately explain the 
technology to judges in many cases.  There is nothing to suggest that judges 
do not have the capacity to understand the Internet, e-mail, pen registers, 
and other technologies.  Kerr is right that there are many times when judges 
are lazy and do not acquire a good understanding, but the same is true of 
legislators.  Kerr does not offer a reason why the institutional structure of 
legislatures shields them from the tendency to be lazy, any more than the 
institutional structure of the judiciary shields the courts from laziness. 
To illustrate his claim that new technologies are too complex for simple 
judicial minds to grasp, Kerr points to United States v. Bach.195  The district 
court in that case, according to Kerr, misunderstood how “ISPs comply with 
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court orders to produce records.”196  Is this an issue of high technology?  
Kerr wrote an amicus brief and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit agreed with him and reversed.  This is an example of the courts 
getting it right and understanding the technology.  Kerr himself helped 
supply the facts about the technology to the Eighth Circuit, and the judges 
decided the case correctly, according to Kerr.  At most, this example 
demonstrates how a district court decided a case incorrectly and was then 
reversed by a court of appeals.  This is hardly a demonstration of the failure 
of the judiciary to grasp the facts.  By all accounts, this example 
demonstrates that the judicial process works.  This is a success story.  The 
judges got the correct information and decided the case correctly, according 
to Kerr. 
Kerr then claims that this example is an anomaly:  “[I]n most cases, 
courts will not possess an informed understanding of the technical facts 
they need to appreciate the technology they are attempting to regulate.”197  
Why not?  This is a bald assumption that Kerr’s example does not support.  
The information necessary to understand the technology that Kerr describes 
is readily available.  In fact, a search of Westlaw will reveal Kerr’s own 
articles explaining this technology quite clearly and succinctly.  All a judge 
has to do is pull up one of Kerr’s articles and read about four pages to 
understand the technology.  Why is this so complicated?  Why is it beyond 
the time constraints and mental capacities of judges?  The information 
about the technology is readily available and does not take an advanced 
degree in computer science to comprehend.  It is dubious that the brilliant 
minds in Congress have more time to learn the workings of technology than 
judges concentrating on a specific case. 
Furthermore, merely shifting to a statutory regime will not eliminate 
Kerr’s concern with judges misunderstanding technology.  In fact, many 
judicial misunderstandings stem from courts trying to fit new technologies 
into old statutory regimes built around old technologies.  The problem with 
the statutes is that, when they try to track existing technology too closely, 
they become too rule-like and lose the flexibility of a standard.  Basic 
principles get lost or forgotten in the shuffle of technicalities.  Discussions 
about whether certain new technologies fit into the labyrinthine framework 
of electronic surveillance law focus on elucidating confusing definitions or 
navigating complicated distinctions. 
Principles should guide technology, not vice versa.  Instead of focusing 
on statutory puzzles, the law should focus on the real issues at stake:  Does 
a particular technology pose a threat to privacy?  What are the dangers?  
How might they be mitigated or controlled? 
Sadly, courts have also failed to address these important questions, 
instead turning on a crabbed conception of Fourth Amendment privacy that 
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seems to have little connection to the issues raised above.  As a result, the 
Fourth Amendment has been held inapplicable to many new technologies, 
creating the void that has been filled, rather poorly, by Congress.  The 
answer to the problem of creating rules to regulate law enforcement and 
new technologies is not to call for judicial caution and leave it to 
legislatures to draft the primary law.  Rather, the answer is simply to craft 
better rules. 
B.  Difficult Questions for a Dualist Criminal Procedure Regime 
The legislative regime Kerr extols suffers from substantial problems both 
in process and substance.  This Article has attempted to demonstrate why 
Kerr’s argument for a legislative institutional advantage is in error.  In 
doing so, I am not arguing that courts have an institutional advantage over 
legislatures.  I remain highly skeptical of institutional competence 
arguments, which were a staple of the legal process jurisprudence of the 
1950s and 1960s.198  As Edward Rubin observes, the “central principle [of 
legal process jurisprudence] was that each governmental institution 
possesses a distinctive area of competence such that specific tasks can be 
assigned to that institution without reference to the substantive policies 
involved.”199  Elsewhere, I have contended that institutional competence 
arguments often assume that institutions have “an inherent and unchanging 
nature.”200  This is a dubious assumption.  In the context of crafting rules to 
regulate law enforcement and new technologies, I am not convinced that 
either the legislatures or the courts have strong advantages over the other. 
Despite the fact that I find Kerr’s case in favor of legislatures to be 
wanting, his article is successful at dispelling myths that have long hung 
over criminal procedure.  Kerr is quite right that criminal procedure is no 
longer a realm of judicial constitutional rules, but instead is increasingly 
becoming a regime of statutes.201 
This development of a dualist regime of both judicial and legislative rules 
which sometimes overlap and interact requires significantly more attention.  
Thus far, the criminal procedure literature has ignored the fact that we are in 
a dualist regime, with both legislative and judicial rules.  This raises many 
questions:  How should courts and legislatures proceed?  What should the 
proper response to the rise of legislative rules be for courts in particular, 
which used to have more of a monopoly on creating criminal procedure 
rules?  In light of Congress’s increasing foray into criminal procedure, what 
should the courts do? 
 
 198. Solove, The Darkest Domain, supra note 113, at 1010-11. 
 199. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1396 (1996). 
 200. Solove, The Darkest Domain, supra note 113, at 1011. 
 201. “[A] basic understanding of criminal procedure rules may someday require as much 
knowledge of the United States Code as the United States Reports.” Kerr, Constitutional 
Myths, supra note 1, at 806. 
    
2005] FOURTH AMENDMENT CODIFICATION 775 
 
When there is no legislative rule addressing an issue, courts should apply 
the Fourth Amendment without any deference or caution.  This does not 
mean that the Fourth Amendment should always apply, but there is no 
justification for caution or restraint in applying it.  The courts have taken 
too narrow a view of the Fourth Amendment with regard to many issues 
involving information, such as the third party doctrine.202  Courts have 
restricted Fourth Amendment applicability based on a narrow conception of 
privacy, which has impeded courts in looking at the crucial question of 
whether a particular law enforcement practice creates a problem, and if so, 
how that problem ought to be addressed.  In other words, the Fourth 
Amendment often gets caught up in an analytical game that loses sight of 
the problems.  As a result, the Fourth Amendment does not protect against 
serious threats to privacy and many law enforcement abuses.  A better 
approach toward applying the Fourth Amendment is definitely in order, and 
such an approach should not be discouraged in favor of the hope of 
legislative solutions. 
A different scenario exists when courts must examine a case involving 
new technologies where a federal statute already exists to regulate law 
enforcement use of those technologies.  These are cases where, for example, 
the Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act, or Pen Register Act would 
apply.  Courts could take a few possible approaches.  First, in order to 
preserve the space upon which Congress has legislated, courts could hold 
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply.  Such an approach should be 
rejected, as the federal legislation in many cases has not been sufficiently 
protective of privacy. 
Second, courts could hold that the Fourth Amendment applies, and then 
determine whether Congress’s legislation is adequate to satisfy Fourth 
Amendment requirements.  This Article supports such an approach.  
Although, in many cases, warrants supported by probable cause are the best 
form of protection,203 warrants are a means to an end, not an end in 
themselves.  Elsewhere, I identified three central principles embodied in the 
Fourth Amendment:  minimization, particularization, and control.204  
Government investigations must be minimized to prevent sweeping dragnet 
searches.  Investigations must be particularized to specific individuals 
suspected of criminal wrongdoing.  And there must be meaningful oversight 
over law enforcement activities. 
In any particular case in which the Fourth Amendment applies, courts 
should apply the Fourth Amendment as they normally would.  But suppose 
that law enforcement officials were following a statute that establishes 
different procedures for conducting surveillance or searches than typical 
Fourth Amendment rules.  Here, the courts should not hold the law 
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enforcement activity invalid simply because it was not conducted pursuant 
to the regular Fourth Amendment rules the courts have established.  These 
regular, judicial Fourth Amendment rules should be viewed as the default 
rules, not the only valid rules.  Thus, courts should examine whether the 
statutory procedures followed by law enforcement in a given case satisfy 
the basic principles of the Fourth Amendment.  If law enforcement officials 
follow a statutory provision that departs from regular Fourth Amendment 
procedures but nevertheless adequately addresses minimization, 
particularization, and control, then courts should conclude that the search 
was valid.  Certainly, courts should not have a monopoly on crafting the 
rules, and this is where courts and legislatures can establish a useful 
dialogue.205 
To illustrate this approach more concretely, suppose that Congress passes 
the Thermal Sensor Protection Act (“TSPA”).  The TSPA provides a set of 
rules to regulate law enforcement use of a thermal sensor.  The TSPA, 
however, also allows the use of a thermal sensor based on a court order that 
differs in its standards from the Kyllo requirements for a warrant supported 
by probable cause.  Although the court order is not a warrant, it does have 
other built-in protections.  Courts should not simply conclude that any 
procedures that differ from the traditional ones required in Kyllo are invalid 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Instead, courts should examine whether the 
TSPA adequately addresses minimization, particularization, and control.  If 
it does, then the surveillance should be upheld. 
The Wiretap Act represents an example of this process.  Under traditional 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, search warrants generally authorize a single 
search.  A second search is sometimes justified if it “is a reasonable 
continuation of the original search.”206  For electronic surveillance, these 
restrictive rules would not make much sense.  Surveillance generally must 
be continuous and extend for a period of time in order to capture the 
necessary communications.  The Wiretap Act authorizes a long period of 
surveillance, specifically a thirty-day order renewable for another thirty-day 
period.207  This is much broader than the kind of search the Fourth 
Amendment typically permits.  The Wiretap Act, however, has other 
protections to compensate for the departure from these minimization goals 
of the Fourth Amendment.  It requires that courts place minimization 
procedures in surveillance orders, and it makes such orders harder to justify, 
with law enforcement officials having to explain why other investigative 
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techniques would not be viable.208  It limits the kind of officials who may 
obtain such an order to high-level officials.209  As a result, it compensates 
for the thirty-day rule with other ways to achieve minimization.  This 
provision came about because, just a year before its passage, the Court in 
Berger explained how Fourth Amendment principles were to be embodied 
in electronic surveillance law.210 
In the Berger model, the Court played a leading role in the process.  The 
Court laid down the basic principles and then let Congress work out the 
specifics.  Courts should look to whether legislation comports with basic 
Fourth Amendment principles.  Congress can fill in the gaps or be more 
precise where necessary, but this is a bold role for the courts, not a cautious 
one. 
In short, courts should be very active in shaping new criminal procedure 
rules.  To the extent that Kerr is urging courts to apply basic Fourth 
Amendment principles and be open to allowing legislatures to fill in the 
details, his advice is sound.  But Kerr’s article appears to suggest much 
more than that. 
Kerr is right that we need to do a lot more thinking about our dualist 
system of criminal procedure.  Scholars and many courts still operate under 
the assumption that the Fourth Amendment is the nearly exclusive occupier 
of the field.  Now that we have a large body of statutory regulation, there 
are new questions about how we should modulate the relationship between 
the Fourth Amendment and the statutes. 
Kerr’s article has made a significant contribution.  It is time for a focus 
on statutes.  Unfortunately, the bulk of his article focuses on pushing the 
courts aside and suggesting a deferential approach based on faulty legal 
process arguments and an incorrect view of the effectiveness of the statutes.  
Far from being cautious, courts need to take a larger role in the process to 
ensure that the statutes embody basic Fourth Amendment principles. 
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